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AN AFFIRMATION OF SECTION 404
JURISDICTION OVER WETLANDS: UNITED
STATES v. RIVERSIDE BA YVIEW
HOMES, INC.
The preservation of wetlands is critical to the ecological maintenance
and stability of the nation's aquatic system.1 Federal initiatives to pre-
vent the destruction of wetlands have generally focused on both Sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act (the Act)2 and the Army Corps of
1. Wetlands are defined as "lands where saturation with water is the dominant fac-
tor determining the nature of soil development and the types of plant and animal com-
munities living in the soil and on its surface." FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, CLASSIFICATION OF WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABI-
TATS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1979). Wetlands include areas such as salt marshes,
freshwater marshes, swamps, bogs and similar lands. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY, OUR NATION'S WETLANDS: AN INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
REPORT 7-14 (1978) (general discussion of current wetland policies and concerns)
[hereinafter cited as COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY].
Wetlands are important to the environment because of the valuable ecological serv-
ices they provide. These services include food chain production (providing general
habitat for aquatic and land species), water purification (providing natural water filtra-
tion by removing sediment and silt), groundwater recharge (primarily where surface
and ground water are interconnected), flood control (providing storage areas for precip-
itation runoff), and land conservation (shielding areas from wave actions, erosion, or
storm damage). Id. at 19-28. See also 42 Fed. Reg. 37,136-37 (1977) (codified at 33
C.F.R. § 320.4 (1985)). The monetary worth of the water purification and flood control
services alone is estimated at over $140 billion. 123 CONG. REC. 38,994 (1977) (re-
marks of Rep. Lehman). For further discussion concerning the value of wetlands, see
generally 123 CONG. REC. 26,710-29 (1977), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, 95TH CONG., IsT SESs., 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1977 at 869 (Comm. Print 1977) [herein-
after cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY at 28-
29.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). This section empowers the Secretary of the Army to
issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters at sites
over which the Army Corps of Engineers has regulatory jurisdiction.
If an area falls within the Corps of Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction, the landowner
must apply for a permit before proceeding with the disposal of fill material. Id. The
Corps of Engineers will not issue a permit if it determines that the discharge of landfill
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on the ecological and recreational functions of
the area. Id.
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Engineers' regulations implementing Section 404.3 Federal district and
appellate courts have interpreted Section 404 to include a variety of
waters, including those denominated as wetlands.4 In United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the Corps of Engineers' Section 404 program, regulating the dis-
charge of material into "navigable waters," is valid because it protects
wetlands in accordance with the standards of the Clean Water Act.6
In Riverside, Riverside Corporation sought to develop an eighty acre
tract of undeveloped suburban land.7 Before receiving approval of
their Section 404 landfill permit application by the Corps of Engineers,
Riverside commenced the landfill operation. Subsequently, the Corps
of Engineers refused to approve the application and issued Riverside a
cease and desist order enjoining further deposit of landfill.' In addi-
tion, the Corps of Engineers requested the United States Attorney's
office to bring enforcement proceedings against Riverside to insure
3. 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 323, 325 (1985). These regulations, by definition, prescribe
"policies, practices, and procedures to be followed by the Corps of Engineers in connec-
tion with the review of application for... permits to authorize the discharge of dredge
or fill material into waters of the United States pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act." 33 C.F.R. § 323.1 (1985).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has concurrent regulatory jurisdiction
with the Corps of Engineers to administrate dredge and fill permits. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1
(1985). The EPA's primary responsibilities include making official wetlands determina-
tions and overseeing the permit programs of states. Id. See Avoyelles Sportsmen's
League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 911 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra notes 28-53 and
accompanying text for a historical discussion of the current wetlands definition in § 323.
4. See, eg., United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1983) (swamps); Leslie
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978) (tidal marshlands); Weiszmann v.
District Engineer, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976) (man-made canals); Buttrey v. United
States, 573 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. La. 1983) (bayous); Conservation Council v. Constanzo,
398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975) (salt meadows); P.F.Z.
Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.C. 1975) (mangrove wetlands); United
States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) (normally dry ar-
royos); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (mangrove wet-
lands and man-made canals).
5. 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
6. Id. at 463. The Court found that a narrow reading of the Corps of Engineers'
regulatory jurisdiction over wetlands was not necessary to avoid a taking without just
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. Id. at 458-60. See infra notes 65-70,
73-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the taking issue.
7. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
8. Id. at 393. The Corps of Engineers concluded that "the existing fill has had an
adverse impact on the wetland and its function as a flood-water storage area, water
quality enhancement basin and fish and wildlife habitat." Brief for the United States at
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compliance with the order.9 At the hearing, Riverside contended that
the property at issue did not constitute wetlands under the Corps of
Engineers' regulations,'" and thus did not fall under the Corps' Section
404 jurisdiction. " The District Court for the Eastern District of Mich-
igan rejected Riverside's argument, holding that the land did in fact
constitute a wetlands, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting
Riverside from further discharge of landfill. 2 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further proceed-
ings in accordance with the Corps of Engineers' 1977 promulgation of
the final wetlands regulations.' 3 On remand, the district court reaf-
firmed its issuance of the permanent injunction.' 4 Riverside again ap-
pealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit,15 where the court concluded
10-11 n.8, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985) (No.
84-701) [hereinafter referred to as Brief for the United States].
Upon discovery of unauthorized filling activity, the Corps of Engineers may issue an
order prohibiting further work. 33 C.F.R. § 326.2(a) (1985).
9. 729 F.2d at 393. The Corps of Engineers is authorized to refer cases involving
the unauthorized discharge of fill material into navigable waters to the United States
Attorney's office for enforcement. 33 C.F.R. § 326.4(c) (1985).
10. See infra note 46 and accompanying text for pertinent text and discussion of the
regulation.
11. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 20,445 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Riverside presented testimony in the district court
alleging that the contiguous navigable waters did not contribute to the presence of wet-
land vegetation. Id. The district court, applying the relevant wetlands regulation,
found that the land in question was rarely if ever inundated, but exhibited a history of
periodic inundation sufficient to invoke a wetland classification. Id. at 20,446-47. See
infra note 46 for pertinent text of the regulation applied by the district court.
12. 7 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20,445. Judge Kennedy stated that, in
fact, "there have been periods in only 14 of the 80 years of recorded lake levels in which
the monthly mean inundated the property,-or, 17 percent of the time. Some of the
higher elevations have been inundated only during the last recent unprecedented high
water or have never been inundated." Id. at 20,446.
The district court then held that "periodic inundation," for the purposes of the defini-
tion, was at least five times in the past eighty years. This left approximately 80% of the
land protected as a wetland. Id. For a general discussion of the district court decision,
see Jackson & Armitage, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes: A Questionable
Interpretation of§ 404, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,336, 10,367 (1984).
13. 615 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1980). These regulations came into effect while the
district court was reviewing the case. For pertinent text of the regulations and discus-
sion, see infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
14. 729 F.2d at 394, 396. Judge Gilmore found the new regulation "broader than
Its predecessor," therefore including all wetlands so classified under the prior regula-
tions. Id.
15. Id. at 392.
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that the district court had improperly applied the new regulations. The
appellate court, therefore, vacated the injunction and dismissed the
government's claim.16 On writ of certiorari from Riverside,17 the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had properly
concluded that the property was within the Army Corps of Engineers'
jurisdiction and therefore subject to the protection of the wetlands
regulations.
18
By passing the Clean Water Act, Congress intended "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's
waters."19 The Act provides a detailed program for the control and
eventual elimination of water pollution.20 The relevant legislative his-
tory reveals that Congress intended the Act's provisions to be inter-
preted as broadly as possible under the Constitution.21
16. Id. at 391. The court of appeals excluded from the Corps of Engineers' regula-
tory program wetlands that were not flooded by adjacent navigable waters at a fre-
quency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation. Id. at 398. The court
stated first that it is "certainly not clear from the statute" that the Corps of Engineers'
jurisdiction should extend beyond navigable-in-fact waters to inland properties such as
freshwater wetlands that are rarely inundated. Id. at 397. In addition, the court as-
serted that a narrow interpretation of the wetlands regulations was necessary to avoid
an unconstitutional taking of private property under the fifth amendment. Id. at 398.
17. 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
18. 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982). In 1972, Congress passed amendments to the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). These amendments established the first
federal program for water pollution control. Brief for the United States at 3 n. 1. Con-
gress changed the title of the FWPCA to the Clean Water Act in 1977. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 (endnote entitled "Short Title of 1977 Amendment").
20. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 (1975) (Clean Water Act pro-
vides "a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution"); United
States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 372-73 (10th Cir. 1979).
21. The Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works submitted with
S.2770 (the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments) stated: "Through a narrow interpre-
tation of the definition of interstate waters the implementation (of the) 1965 (FWPCA)
was severely limited. Water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that discharge
of pollutants be controlled at the source." S. Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 77
(1972); 2 LEGISLATIVE, HISTORY at 1495.
The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference noted: "[T]he con-
ferees fully intend that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible consti-
tutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made
or may be made for administrative purposes." Conference Report, S. Rep. No. 1236,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 33,756-57 (1972); 1 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY at 327.
Finally, in presenting the conference version of S.2770 to the House of Representa-
tives, Representative Dingell voiced the Committee's intention in defining the scope of
Section 404: "[T]he conference bill defines the term 'navigable waters' broadly for
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol30/iss1/11
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Congress enacted the Act in exercise of its commerce clause
power.21 Section 301(a)23 curtails the discharge of pollutants into the
nation's waters by allowing only those discharges complying with Sec-
tion 404 permit procedures.24 Because Congress did not explicitly in-
water quality purposes. It means all 'waters of the United States' in a geographical
sense. It does not mean 'navigable waters of the United States' in the technical sense as
we sometimes see in some laws." 118 CONG. REc. 33,756 (1972); 1 LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY at 250. See also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-
16 (5th Cir. 1983); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 754-55 & n.15 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325-29 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 671-73 (M.D. Fla. 1974); see gener-
ally Blumm, The Clean Water Act's Section 404 Permit Program Enters Its Adolescence:
An Institutional and Programmatic Perspective, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 409 (1980) (historical
scope of Section 404 jurisdiction).
22. "The Congress shall have power.., to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Gibbons v. Odgen,
22 U.S. 1 (1824) (judicial affirmation of the scope of Congress' power under the com-
merce clause). Congress is empowered to regulate water pollution under the commerce
clause because pollution affects the health and welfare of the nation. See Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
When Congress passed the Clean Water Act, Representative Dingell of the Commit-
tee of Conference asserted that "there is no requirement in the Constitution that the
waterway must cross a State boundary in order to be within the interstate commerce
power of the Federal Government. Rather, it is enough that the waterway serves as a
link in the chain of commerce among the states .. " 118 CONG. REc. 33,756 (1972); 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 250. See generally United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp.
Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1323-29 (6th Cir. 1974) (tracing the development of Congress' con-
stitutional power to regulate the nation's waterways under the commerce clause).
Cases decided under the authority of § 404 of the Clean Water Act affirm this consti-
tutional grant of power. See, e.g., Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984)
(CWA jurisdiction reaches intrastate lake that supports no interstate navigation); Avoy-
elles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 916 (5th Cir. 1983) (CWA grant
of jurisdiction not an unlawful delegation of legislative power); United States v. Byrd,
609 F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (7th Cir. 1979) (CWA grants the Corps of Engineers authority
to regulate activities on an inland lake used by interstate travellers for recreation); Leslie
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (CWA jurisdiction under the
commerce clause broad enough to reach diked evaporation ponds); Buttrey v. United
States, 573 F. Supp. 283, 295 (E.D. La. 1983) (proper interpretation of "navigability"
under the commerce clause); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181,
1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (rejects the argument that CWA's definition of "navigable waters"
is void for vagueness under the fifth amendment); United States v. Holland, 373 F.
Supp. 665, 671-73 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (CWA jurisdiction over wetland "reasonably re-
lated to" interstate commerce).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
24. Section 402 of the Act also curtails the discharge of pollutants into the nation's
waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). This section regulates industrial and municipal point
source discharges of pollutants into the nation's waters. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,123 (1977).
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elude wetlands within the Act's language, 25 enforcement of the Act
over wetlands is left to the Corps of Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction
over "navigable waters" as defined in Section 404.26
The first regulations that defined "navigable waters" under Section
40427 included those waters regulated by the Corps of Engineers in
accordance with Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.28
In addition, the Corps of Engineers exerted jurisdiction over all waters
25. Section 404 protects against the discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters."
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). The Clean Water Act defines "navigable waters" as "the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
26. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for the Corps of Engineers' current
regulatory definition of "waters of the United States."
In 1977, Congress rejected an amendment to § 404 that would have limited the scope
of the Corps of Engineers' statutory jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to that of the
Rivers and Harbors Act, thereby including waters that were in fact navigable, plus adja-
cent or contiguous wetlands. See H.R. 3199, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 16 (1977). The
defeat of this amendment evidenced Congress' intent to include wetlands within § 404
jurisdiction. See, eg., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-
16 (5th Cir. 1983); Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 626
(8th Cir. 1979); 123 CONG. REc. 10,426-32, 26,710-29 (1977), (congressional debates
over proposed 1977 amendments). See also Jackson & Armitage, supra note 12, at
10,368-69 (short discussion of the 1977 debates to amend § 404); Caplin, Is Congress
Protecting Our Waters? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollution Con-
trolAct Amendments of 1972, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 445 (1977) (attempts to amend § 404
inconsistent with congressional objective to maintain broad jurisdiction to control pollu-
tion at its source).
Proposed amendments to the Clean Water Act would restrict federal jurisdiction
under § 404 to navigable-in-fact waters such as those currently protected by § 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. See infra note 28. Opposition to these amendments
expressed concerns similar to those voiced in 1977: "The restrictive definition of navi-
gable waters in S.777 would remove from federal protection 85 percent of the nation's
wetlands, or 126 million of the 148 million acres currently covered. . . ." Clean Water
Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 777 and S. 2652 Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1045-46 (1982) (statement of Jay D. Hair, National Wildlife Federation).
27. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974). See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text
for the scope of the Corps of Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction under this regulation.
28. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act requires
authorization of the Secretary of the Army before any excavation or construction can
take place in "navigable waters." Id. The Corps of Engineers initially used the same
definition of "navigable waters" in administering both § 404 and the Rivers and
Harbors Act. Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 4. The current definition of
"navigable waters" for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors Act, however, had remained
nearly identical to the initial definition. See 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1984). The present
dichotomy between the § 404 and the § 10 regulatory definitions of "navigable waters"
exists because the Clean Water Act focuses primarily on water pollution control,
thereby necessitating federal jurisdiction over point sources of pollution. The Rivers
and Harbors Act, however, focuses on the protection and development of navigation.
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subject to past, present, or future use in interstate or foreign com-
merce, 29 and all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.3 ° Fresh-
water and coastal wetlands protected under this definition included
only those lying below the ordinary and mean high water mark, respec-
tively." These regulations, however, proved insufficient to effectively
implement the Clean Water Act.
In United States v. Holland,3 2 the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida made the first judicial determination that Section 404
protected wetlands above the high water mark. Relying on both the
purpose and the legislative history of the Clean Water Act,3" the dis-
trict court held that land periodically inundated by tidal waters consti-
tuted "navigable waters.",34 The court noted that for the Act to be
effective, it must reach estuarine and adjacent bodies of water 5 vital to
the coastal environment, without regard to the traditional high water
mark limit.36
In United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Holland to determine the scope of
Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 13 (1984).
29 See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (waters
susceptible to use in their ordinary condition or by reasonable improvement to transport
interstate or foreign commerce); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256
U.S. 113 (1921) (waters used in the past to transport interstate or foreign commerce);
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (waters presently used to transport inter-
state or foreign commerce).
30. See United States v. Moretti, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
31. 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(j)(freshwater wetlands) and (k)(tidal wetlands) (1974). See
also 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,128 (1977).
32. 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
33. Id. at 674-76. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
34. 373 F. Supp. at 676.
35. The court defined estuaries as "[p]artially enclosed bodies of water within which
there is a measurable dilution of sea water by fresh-water run off." Id. at 675. Estuaries
are valuable resources because they provide breeding zones for organic matter and re-
plenish oxygen for the atmosphere. Id.
36. Id. The court rendered its decision less than a month before the Corps of Engi-
neers published regulations including wetlands in their regulatory jurisdiction. The
court stated that "the mean high water line is no limit to federal authority under the
[Clean Water Act]." 373 F. Supp. at 676.
37. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974). The defendant, Ashland Oil, inadvertantly dis-
charged oil into a nonnavigable stream. The government brought suit against Ashland,
alleging a violation of the Clean Water Act for failing to notify the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency after the discharge. Id. at 1319.
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the Clean Water Act.38 The court initially stated that because water
pollution is subject to congressional restraint,39 pollution control of
navigable waters may be effected only by controlling pollution of their
tributaries.4 Thus, the court held that Congress must have intended
the Act to protect both traditionally navigable waters and nonnaviga-
ble tributaries of such waters.41
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,42 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia applied the Corps of Engi-
neers' original regulations for the last time. In Callaway, the district
court, relying on the Ashland Oil rationale, held that under the Clean
Water Act the federal government retained jurisdiction over "naviga-
ble waters" to the maximum extent permissible under the commerce
clause.4 3 The court then ordered the Corps of Engineers to publish
new regulations consistent with this broad assertion of jurisdiction.44
In response to the court order in Callaway, the Corps of Engineers
published interim final regulations in order to implement a new Section
404 program.45  These regulations extended Section 404 jurisdiction
over freshwater wetlands beyond the high water mark to adjacent wet-
lands periodically inundated by water and characterized by the
prevalance of acquatic vegetation.4 In 1977, the Corps of Engineers
38. As in Holland, the court found it significant that Congress' intent in passing the
Clean Water Act was to regulate both navigable waters and their nonnavigable tributa-
ries. Id. at 1323-25. See supra note 21 for congressional documentation of this intent.
39. 504 F.2d at 1328.
40. Id. at 1327.
41. Id. at 1318. Although not decided under § 404, Ashland Oil provides a guide
for subsequent courts concerning the interpretation and constitutionality of § 404 juris-
diction. Jackson & Armitage, supra note 12, at 10,369. See, e.g., Utah v. Marsh, 740
F.2d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 1984); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897,
916 n.33 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538 (1lth Cir. 1983);
United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ciampitti,
583 F. Supp. 483, 491 (D.N.J. 1984).
42. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). For a discussion of the Callaway decision and
its legal impact, see Currin, Clean Water Act Section 404 Jurisdiction: Mandate for
Reform, DET. C.L. REv. 825 (1982); Note, Wetlands Protection Under the Corps of
Engineers New Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 223 (1976).
43. 392 F. Supp. at 686. The court expressly stated that the term "waters of the
United States" was not limited to waters that were navigable in fact. Id. See supra note
22 (discussing the applicability of the commerce clause to § 404 cases).
44. 392 F. Supp. at 686.
45. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(h)(freshwater wetlands) and (i)(coastal wetlands)
(1976).
46. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(2)(h). The freshwater definition is relevant to the River-
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published final regulations, revising the Section 404 program to clarify
its policies and procedures.47
The 1977 regulations, presently in effect, extend the Corps of Engi-
neers' Section 404 jurisdiction over "navigable waters" to include navi-
gable waters protected in the original regulations, 48 tributaries of these
navigable waters, 49 interstate wetlands and their tributaries5" and wet-
lands whose use or destruction could affect interstate commerce.5 1 In
addition, the Corps of Engineers amended the wetlands definition to
protect lands sufficiently inundated or saturated to support a
prevalance of aquatic vegetation.
52
Subsequent case law eliminated any doubt that Section 404 provided
the Corps of Engineers with jurisdiction over wetlands. 53 For example,
side facts because the disputed land lies inland and is not adjacent to a body of tidal
water. The pertinent definition states: "'Freshwater wetlands' means those areas that
are periodically inundated and that are normally characterized by the prevalence of
vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction." Id.
47. By revising the definition, the Corps of Engineers intended to: (1) identify wet-
lands as they presently exist, not according to status over a period of time; and (2) allow
for wetland classification where either surface water, ground water, or both cause inun-
dation or saturation sufficient to support aquatic vegetation. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128
(1977).
The Corps of Engineers recently declined to amend the current wetlands definition.
The proposed amendments, the Corps noted, "did not provide any improvement on a
technical basis." 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,795 (1982).
48. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(1) (1985). This and subsequent regulations noted under
§ 323.2(a) were first implemented in 1975 in accordance with the Callaway decision.
49. Id. at § 323.2(a)(5).
50. Id. at § 323.2(a)(2), (7).
51. Id. at § 323.2(a)(3).
52. Id. at § 323.2(c). This definition, currently in effect, states in pertinent part:
"The term 'wetlands' means those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in satu-
rated soil conditions." Id. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the
Corps of Engineers' rationale for amending this definition).
53. United States federal courts uniformly construe § 404 to specifically include
wetlands. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 914-16
(5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Tilton, 705 F.2d 429, 431 (1lth Cir. 1983); United
States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 538 (1lth Cir. 1983); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d
1204, 1209-11 (7th Cir. 1979); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 753-56 (9th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Saint Bernard Parish, 589 F. Supp. 617, 619-21 (E.D. La.
1984); United States v. Lambert, 589 F. Supp. 366, 370-71 (M.D. Fla. 1984); United
States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 491-97 (D.N.J. 1984); Buttrey v. United States,
573 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (E.D. La. 1983); United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp.
1157, 1163 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. United States Corps of
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in Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh,54 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the legislative history of the Clean
Water Act,55 held the 1977 wetlands definition promulgated by the
Corps of Engineers consistent with congressional intent in passing the
Act.5 6 The court adopted a three-pronged test to determine whether
wetlands fall within the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers' regula-
tions.57 The three parts of the test include consideration of the type of
vegetation on the land, the degree to which the land is inundated by
water, and the type of soil and its degree of saturation. 8
Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1025, 1035-36 (E.D. La. 1982); United States v. Lee Wood
Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1981); United States v. Brad-
shaw, 541 F. Supp. 880, 882-83 (D. Md. 1981); Florida Wildlife Federation v. Gold-
schmidt, 506 F. Supp. 350, 364-65 (S.D. Fla. 1981), United States v. Weisman, 489 F.
Supp. 1331, 1336-39 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd, 632 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980); American Dredg-
ing Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 960 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 769 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Conservation Council v. Constanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 673-74 (E.D.N.C.),
aff'd, 528 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 670-76
(M.D. Fla. 1974); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186-88 (Ct. Cl.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
54. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
55. I7d. at 914-16.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 931. The court followed the same methodology employed by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency in making the initial wetlands determination. Id. at 930.
The court noted that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, such determinations are
entitled to a presumption of regularity and may be set aside only when found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law," or when they fail to meet constitutional, statutory, or procedural requirements.
Id. at 904. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(B),(Q,(D) (1982) (outlining the rules for review
of informal government agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act);
Buttrey v. United States, 690 F.2d 1170, 1183-86 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
927 (1983) (upholding Corps' wetland determination after review under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act); Deltona Corp. v. Alexander, 682 F.2d 888, 893-94 (1 Ith Cir.
1982) (holding that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before questioning
Corps' jurisdiction); Buttrey v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 283, 292-97 (E.D. La. 1983)
(court rejected as arbitrary and capricious Corps' determination that a bayou was a
wetland).
58. Applying the first prong, the court held that the wetlands definition included
vegetation living in saturated soil even though such a species could not survive its entire
life cycle in saturated soils. 715 F.2d at 913. See also United States v. Lambert, 589 F.
Supp. 366, 371 (M.D. Fla. 1984). Previous cases relied on the separate elements of the
Avoyelles test to uphold the wetland determination by the Corps of Engineers. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 489-90 (D.N.J. 1984) (vegetation, soil and
animal life); United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 1163-64 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
(vegetation); Bayou Des Familles Dev. Corp. v. United States Corps of Engineers, 541
F. Supp. 1025, 1036 n.5 (E.D. La. 1982) (vegetation and soil); United States v. Lee
Wood Contracting, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 119, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (soil and vegeta-
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In United States v. City of Fort Pierre,59 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals deviated from the judicial interpretation of the wetlands defi-
nition employed in Avoyelles. ° The court in Fort Pierre found that the
characteristics of a slough6 1 brought it within the scope of the wetlands
definition.62 The court, however, noted that these characteristics were
the unintended result of nearby dredging activity and not the result of
natural evolution.63 In holding that the Corps of Engineers could not
assert jurisdiction in such a situation, the court stated that allowing the
slough to be characterized as a wetland would contradict the congres-
sional goals of conservation and public utility in passing the Clean
Water Act.'
Although the preceding cases do not directly address the Corps of
Engineers' regulatory power under Section 404, landowners denied a
Section 404 permit have challenged the government regulations under
the fifth amendment in actions alleging the uncompensated taking of
tion); United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 1338-39 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (inunda-
tion and vegetation).
59. 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984).
60. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
61. The court characterized the Fort Pierre Slough as a river bottom where wet-
land-type vegetation thrives in stagnant and often polluted water. 747 F.2d at 466.
62. Id. Initially, the court affirmed the Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction over the
nation's wetlands as constitutional. Id. at 465. The court cited United States v. Tilton,
705 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1983), to support its contention that regulatory jurisdiction
should be exercised to the full extent permissible under the Constitution. 747 F.2d at
465.
63. The court deemed the result "unintended" because the Corps of Engineers filled
approximately 14 acres of the slough with sand drawn from the Missouri River in con-
junction with routine river maintenance. Id. at 466. This filling activity effectively pre-
vented the further drainage of surface water from the slough.
64. Id. at 467. The court stated: "Not only is the water in the Slough stagnant and
polluted, but the Slough... is now devoid of wildlife, supports no fish or fowl, and is
not conducive to recreation or other significant use by the public." Id. Because the
court had no jurisdictional precedent for its decision, it limited the holding to situations
when a wetland system is inadvertantly created on private property. Id.
But see United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 494 (D.N.J. 1984) ("This court
finds that federal jurisdiction is determined by whether the site is presently wetlands
and not by how it came to be wetlands,"); United States v. Bradshaw, 541 F. Supp. 880,
883 (D. Md. 1981) (wetlands determination upheld although land in question became
marshlands after construction of mosquito ditches by the government); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) ("The fact that these canals were man-
made makes no difference. They were constructed long before the development scheme
was conceived.")
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private property. 5 In Deltona Corp. v. United States,66 a land devel-
oper claimed the Corps' actions constituted a taking under the fifth
amendment through inverse condemnation, therefore entitling him to
just compensation.67 The United States Court of Claims, applying the
Supreme Court's taking clause analysis, 68 rejected the developer's con-
tention that the denial of his ability to exploit a property interest-the
property's "highest and best use"--established a taking. 69 The court
upheld the Corps' denial of the application, concluding that no taking
had occurred because of the property's many remaining economically
viable uses and because the public benefits resulting from the Section
404 regulations outweighed the value of the property's intended use.70
65. The taking clause of the fifth amendment provides: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNsT. art. V, cl. 4.
Taking clause analysis indicates that government administrative regulations may ef-
fect a taking of private property without just compensation when such regulations "de-
stroy all or substantially all of the property's beneficial use." Smithwick v. Alexander,
17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2131 (4th Cir. 1981). These regulations, however, must
actually deprive an owner of existing property rights or place a permanent servitude on
the property before a taking is found. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
262 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1977);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
66. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
67. 657 F.2d at 1189.
68. Id. at 1191. This test provides: "The application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legit-
imate state interests... or denies a[n] owner economically viable use of his land. .. "
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See also Smithwick, 17 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 2131 ("The test generally applied.., is whether the governmental inter-
ference is so substantial as to deprive an owner of all or most of his interest in the
property."); American Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 960 (E.D. Pa.
1979), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 769 (3rd Cir. 1979) (zoning cases generally "uphold land
use restrictions, if based on some sound public good, even where individually affected
landowners suffer substantial financial disadvantage").
69. 657 F.2d at 1193. The developer used this rationale to argue that the permit
denial deprived him of receiving the highest and best economic use of his property. The
court, however, equated this deprivation with a diminution in property value, and cited
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978), for the proposi-
tion that mere diminution of value alone is insufficient to establish a taking. 657 F.2d at
1193.
70. Id. at 1194. For additional requirements concerning inverse condemnation ac-
tions such as that in Deltona, see generally Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct.
2862, 2880-81 (1984); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 295-97 (1981); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932) (each requiring
unavailability of just compensation under the Tucker Act before a fifth amendment
violation occurs); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir. 1979) (requiring
denial of a § 404 permit before a taking claim is ripe for judicial relief); United States v.
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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.7 represents the
Supreme Court's initial attempt to define the scope of the Corps of
Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. In addi-
tion, the Riverside Court considered issues relating to the proper inter-
pretation of the regulations implementing the Act.72 Justice White,
writing for a unanimous Court, initially addressed the Sixth Circuit's
contention that a narrow interpretation of the Corps' wetlands regula-
tions is necessary to avoid fifth amendment taking problems. 73 After
recognizing that government regulations may in some circumstances
effect a taking of private property,74 the Court outlined the conditions
necessary to successfully establish a fifth amendment taking claim.7
Justice White first found that Riverside's taking claim was not ripe for
consideration because the Corps had not denied Riverside's permit re-
quest when these proceedings were instituted.76 Furthermore, the
Court indicated that even if the taking claim was ripe, the Corps' asser-
tion of jurisdiction was constitutional so long as just compensation re-
mained available under the Tucker Act.7 7 The Court concluded that if
Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326-28 (6th Cir. 1974) (refutation of
"navigational servitude" argument when Congress exercises commerce clause author-
ity); United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (requiring
denial of a § 404 permit before a taking claim is ripe for judicial relief); Want, supra
note 28, at 29-33 (discussion of "taking" argument with respect to § 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act and § 404 of the Clean Water Act).
In sum, a landowner must satisfy four conditions before a court will find a § 404
"taking" occurs: (1) denial of a § 404 permit, (2) loss of economically viable use of
property, (3) unavailability of just compensation, and (4) no legitimate state interest is
promoted by the regulation.
71. 106 S. Ct. 455 (1986).
72. See supra note 52 for pertinent definition of wetlands in the Corps of Engineers'
regulations.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 458-60.
74. Id. at 459. The Court cited both Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985), and Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), to support this contention with respect to govern-
mental land use regulations.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 459. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text for discussion
of these conditions and relevant authority cited by the Court. The Court further noted
that "the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not
constitute a regulatory taking." 106 S. Ct. at 459.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 460. The Tucker Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982) and provides
in pertinent part: "The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitu-
tion, or any Act of Congress .... " Courts have interpreted this provision as supplying
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such compensation is available, the possibility that a regulation may
effect a taking in particular instances does not justify a narrowed con-
struction which would impair application of the regulatory program.78
The Court next turned to the proper interpretation of the Corps of
Engineers' wetlands regulations.79 Justice White first found that the
plain language of the regulations8° clearly stated that saturation by
either surface or ground water, if sufficient to support wetlands vegeta-
tion, would categorize an area as a wetlands.81 Justice White then de-
termined that the history of the regulation specifically indicated the
removal of an inundation requirement when the current regulations be-
came effective.82 Thus, the Court concluded that Riverside's property
a means of obtaining compensation for any taking that may occur through the operation
of a federal statute. See, eg., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
The Riverside Court thus concluded that "equitable relief is not available to enjoin an
alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit
for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking." 106 S.
Ct. at 459 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. at 2880).
78. 106 S. Ct. at 460. The Court stated: "Under such circumstances, adoption of a
narrowing construction does not constitute avoidance of a constitutional difficulty ... it
merely frustrates permissible applications of a statute or regulation." Id.
In a footnote, the Court added that construing a statute narrowly to avoid a fifth
amendment taking problem is justified "where it appears that there is an identifiable
class of cases in which application of a statute will necessarily constitute a taking." Id
at n.5. Cf. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
79. 106 S. Ct. at 460-61.
80. See supra note 52 for text of the wetlands definition applied by Justice White.
81. 106 S. Ct. at 460. The Court thereby refuted the court of appeals' holding that
"frequent flooding" by an adjacent body of navigable water is an essential attribute of a
wetlands area. The lower court mandated a two tier test in making a wetlands determi-
nation: "Neither inundation nor aquatic vegetation would be sufficient, standing alone,
to bring a piece of land within the definition. Both must be present, and the latter must
be caused by the former." 729 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1984).
Applying this test, the appellate court found that the aquatic vegetation growing on
Riverside's land resulted from saturated soil on the land, rather than periodic flooding
from an adjacent body of navigable water. Id. at 397. The court intimated that the land
experienced an abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation, and stated that such presence
is insufficient to classify the area as a wetland. Id. at 396-97. See also 42 Fed. Reg.
37,128 (1977) ("the abnormal presence of aquatic vegetation in a non-aquatic area
would not be sufficient to include that area within the Section 404 program").
Rather than accepting the appellate court's conclusion that aquatic vegetation result-
ing from ground water saturation was "abnormal," the Supreme Court interpreted "ab-
normal presence" to identify the growth of wetlands vegetation in dry, upland areas.
106 S. Ct. at 461 n.7.
82. Id. at 461. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for pertinent language
of the replaced regulation and the Corps of Engineers' rationale for the replacement.
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fell within the scope of the Corps' jurisdiction under Section 404.83
Finally, the Court addressed the scope of the Corps of Engineers'
regulatory jurisdiction under Section 404. 4 Justice White confined re-
view to determining whether the Corps' interpretation of Section 404
was reasonable and in accordance with congressional intent."5 The
Court found that due to the degree of congressional concern for both
the integrity of the nation's aquatic system 6 and the ecological services
that this system provides,87 the Corps of Engineers' inclusion of wet-
lands in its regulatory program was not inconsistent with the purpose
of the Clean Water Act.88
The Court also examined the legislative history of the 1977 proposed
amendments to the Clean Water Act to determine the reasonableness
of the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction. 9 The records indicated that
Congress explicitly rejected a narrowed construction of Section 404
designed to limit the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction. 90 Furthermore,
the proposed amendments would have limited only the Corps' Section
404 jurisdiction, leaving intact the Section 301 prohibition against the
83. 106 S. Ct. at 461.
84. Id. at 461-65.
85. Id. The Court relied on the practice of deferring to a governmental agency's
construction of a statute if such construction was reasonable and in harmony with the
language, policies and legislative history of the statute. See, ag., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
86. 106 S. Ct. at 462. The Court specifically noted the Act's legislative history to
evidence Congress' intent to construe the Act broadly. See supra notes 19-21 and ac-
companying text for relevant discussion.
87. 106 S. Ct. at 463. See supra note 1 for a selected list of these services.
88. 106 S. Ct. at 463. In a footnote, the Court emphasized that "if it is reasonable
for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent wetlands have signifi-
cant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem, its definition can stand." Id. at
n.9. This broad regulatory coverage is sanctioned by the Corps' power to issue permits
allowing development of wetlands areas that are not critical to the aquatic environment.
Id. (noting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(4) (1985)).
89. 106 S. Ct. at 464-65. See supra note 26 for a discussion of how these amend-
ments would have curtailed the Corps of Engineers' existing authority under § 404.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 464. The Court therefore concluded that "a refusal by Congress to
overrule an agency's construction of legislation is at least some evidence of the reasona-
bleness of that construction, particularly where the administrative construction has
been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically designed to supplant
it." Id. Justice White cited Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-60
(1983), and United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 & n.10 (1979), to support
this conclusion.
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discharge of pollutants into navigable waters.91 Thus, the Court deter-
mined that Congress recognized both the broad scope of the Corps'
existing jurisdiction, 92 and the importance of continuing a program
regulating discharges into wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters
under the proposed amendments.93
The Riverside decision leaves the broad regulatory jurisdiction of the
Army Corps of Engineers intact.94 The Court's holding includes in
Section 404 those wetlands supporting aquatic vegetation from ground
water saturation, thereby eliminating the appellate court's requirement
of frequent flooding from adjacent navigable waters.95 In addition to
affirming the Corps of Engineers' regulatory jurisdiction, Riverside up-
held the statutory jurisdiction upon which the regulatory jurisdiction is
founded. Riverside utilized Congress' broad power to regulate the wa-
ters of the United States under the commerce clause, 96 and rejected an
attempt to narrow the Corps of Engineers' authority under Section
404.97 The Court correctly found that a taking did not occur because
Congress' assertion of Section 404 jurisdiction over wetlands is within
the exercise of its commerce clause power.98 In addition, impairment
of a governmental regulatory program to avoid a taking problem is not
justified when a remedy exists in law.9 9
Riverside confirms Congress' intent in passing the Clean Water Act.
By rejecting the Sixth Circuit's holding that the Act's jurisdiction over
"navigable waters" should be construed narrowly, the Court avoided
placing a limitation on Section 404 similar to the proposed restrictive
amendments to Section 404 that Congress rejected both in 1977 and
1982.1" The Supreme Court's protection of these environmentally
91. 106 S. Ct. at 465. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982) (§ 301(a) of the Clean Water
Act).
92. 106 S. Ct. at 465.
93. Id.
94. But see Comment, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.: Mountain
or Molehill?, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,333 (1984). The author stated
that the Sixth Circuit's approach left regulatory jurisdiction over most types of wetlands
unimpaired. Furthermore, the court did not purport to apply the Corp's jurisdiction
over wetlands saturated by ground water.
95. 729 F.2d 391, 398 (1984).
96. See supra note 22.
97. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
98. See Brief for the United States, supra note 8, at 32.
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. In fact, the appellate court's requirement of frequent flooding by waters flow-
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critical waters ensures the continued existence and protection of over
three-quarters of the nation's wetlands.
Stephen J. Trichka
ing from adjacent navigable waters restricts § 404 jurisdiction to exactly those waters
sought to be regulated in the 1977 amendments. The appellate court specifically ex-
cluded "inland low-lying areas such as the one in question here that sometimes become
saturated with water." 729 F.2d at 598. These are the areas Congress sought to protect
by defeating the proposed amendments.: "[P]rotection of water quality must encom-
pass the protection of the interior wetlands and smaller streams." 123 CONG. REc.
26,718-19 (1977) (statement of Sen. Baker).
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